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On the structure and complexity of worst-case equilibriaI
Simon Fischer∗, Berthold Vo¨cking
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Abstract
In the resource allocation game introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, n jobs of different weights are assigned to m
identical machines by selfish agents. For this game, it has been conjectured by several authors that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium
(FMNE) is the worst possible w.r.t. the expected maximum load over all machines. Assuming the validity of this conjecture,
computing a worst-case Nash equilibrium for a given instance was trivial, and approximating the Price of Anarchy for this instance
would be possible by approximating the expected social cost of the FMNE by applying a known FPRAS.
We present a counter-example to this conjecture showing that fully mixed Nash equilibria cannot be used to approximate the
Price of Anarchy. We show that the factor between the social cost of the worst Nash equilibrium and the social cost of the FMNE
can be as large as the Price of Anarchy itself, up to a constant factor. In addition, we present an algorithm that constructs so-called
concentrated equilibria that approximate the worst-case Nash equilibria within constant factors.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The problem of scheduling jobs on machines has been studied extensively and in many variants. Whereas classical
results focus on optimising some global objective function, usually the makespan, more recent studies consider
the same problem from a game theoretic perspective where jobs are controlled by agents that try to optimise their
own utility selfishly. The motivation for this new perspective arises from the observation that in many real world
applications, and especially in the Internet, there is no entity that is responsible for, or capable of, central coordination.
In this scenario, a natural question posed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1] asks for the cost of selfish behaviour
measured by the induced degradation of the social cost. More precisely, the coordination ratio or the price of anarchy
is the ratio between the worst-case social cost at a Nash equilibrium and the optimal social cost that can be achieved
by a central authority. Here, a Nash equilibrium is an assignment of jobs to machines such that, given the assignments
of the remaining jobs, no job has an incentive to deviate to another machine unilaterally. In this paper, we consider
the basic case of m identical machines and n agents, each controlling a job of length wi . Agents are allowed to use
so-calledmixed strategies, i.e., they may assign their jobs to the machines in a randomised fashion. More precisely, job
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i is assigned to machine j with probability p ji . The social cost is defined as the expected makespan, i.e., the expected
maximum load of the machine.
In [2] and [3], it has been shown that the coordination ratio for a system of n weighted jobs and m identical
machines is bounded by O (lnm/(ln lnm)). There also exist worst-case instances with a matching coordination ratio
of Ω (lnm/(ln lnm)). Also, for a given instance, i.e., for a specific value of m and a set of weights (wi ), and a given
strategy profile (p ji ), the expected social cost can be approximated arbitrarily well using the fully polynomial time
randomised approximation scheme (FPRAS) presented in [4]. However, the question of how to compute a worst-case
mixed Nash equilibrium and the coordination ratio for a given instance is open. It has been conjectured that the fully
mixed Nash equilibrium, in which every agent assigns the same probability to every machine, is the worst possible [5–
7]. If this conjecture was true, then computing a worst Nash equilibrium would be a trivial task and its social cost
could be approximated using the above-mentioned FPRAS.
In this paper, we show that the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture does not hold. In fact, the ratio between
the social cost of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium and the worst Nash equilibrium can be almost as bad as the
coordination ratio. We then present a different kind of equilibrium that concentrates the large jobs on a few machines.
With respect to the social cost, these concentrated equilibria are as bad as the worst Nash equilibria up to constant
factors. These equilibria can be computed in linear time. In particular, we obtain the first constant-factor approximation
for the worst-case equilibria on identical machines.
1.1. The game
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1] introduced a resource allocation game in which n jobs of size w1, . . . , wn ≥ 0
shall be assigned to m identical machines. The total weight is denoted by Wtot =∑ni=1wi . Each job is managed by a
selfish agent. The set of pure strategies for task i is [m] := {1, . . . ,m}. Let ( j1, . . . , jn) ∈ [m]n be a combination of
pure strategies, one for each task. The load of machine j is defined as
λ j =
∑
jk= j
wk .
The cost for agent i is λ ji . Every agent aims at minimising their own cost. The social objective is to minimise the
maximum cost over all agents or, equivalently, the maximum load over all machines.
Agents may also use mixed strategies, i.e., probability distributions on the set of pure strategies. Let p ji denote the
probability that agent i assigns their job to machine j . Then
E
[
λ j
] = ∑
i∈[n]
wi p
j
i .
The social cost of a mixed strategy profile P = (p ji ) is defined as
SC(P) = E
[
max
j∈[m] λ j
]
.
The expected cost of task i on machine j is
c ji = wi +
∑
k 6=i
wk p
j
k = E
[
λ j
]+ (1− p ji ) wi .
A (mixed) strategy profile P defines a Nash equilibrium if and only if any task i assigns non-zero probabilities only
to machines that minimise c ji , that is, (p
j
i ) > 0 implies c
j
i ≤ cqi , for every q ∈ [m]. A Nash equilibrium is called fully
mixed if p ji > 0 for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]. The game under consideration admits a unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium
F in which each job is assigned with probability 1m to each machine [8].
1.2. The conjecture
Mavronicolas and Spirakis [8] investigate the social cost of fully mixed Nash equilibria. The motivation for their
study is the hope that the techniques for the analysis of fully mixed strategies can be appropriately extended to yield
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upper bounds on the social cost for general equilibria. This hypothesis is formalised in the following conjecture stated
in [5–7].
Conjecture 1 (FMNE Conjecture). The fully mixed Nash equilibrium F is the worst Nash equilibrium, that is,
SC(F) ≥ SC(P),
for every Nash equilibrium P.
Several attempts have been made to prove the conjecture. For example, it was shown that the conjecture is true for the
case m = 2 [5] and for the case where P refers only to pure equilibria [7]. Furthermore, it was shown that if m = n,
the ratio between the cost of any mixed Nash equilibrium and the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is at most twice the
ratio between maximum and average job weight [7]. Other asymptotic results have been presented in [9]. In [4], an
FPRAS for the social cost of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is presented. Further interesting discussions can be
found in [7].
The FMNE conjecture seems to be intuitive and appealing, since in case of its validity it would allow for an easy
identification of the worst-case mixed Nash equilibrium, whereas the worst case pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard to
compute.
1.3. Outline and contribution
In Section 2, we give a counter-example to the FMNE conjecture that shows that mixed Nash equilibria may have a
social cost that is by a factor ofΩ (lnm/ ln lnm)worse than the social cost of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium. This is
indeed the worst possible. In Section 3 we present a simple algorithm that constructs a constant factor approximation
of the worst Nash equilibrium in linear time, provided that the weights wi are sorted. In the appendix, we include
some proofs on well-known facts about balls and bins processes.
2. The counterexample
We present a counterexample to the FMNE conjecture. More specifically, we show that there is a family of simple
instances of the game for which there exists an equilibrium P with
SC(P) = Ω
(
SC(F) · lnm
ln lnm
)
.
Let us remark that this is the worst possible ratio, as it follows from the analyses in [2,3] that the social cost of every
Nash equilibrium can be at most O (lnm/ ln lnm) times the optimal social cost.
For the proof of the main theorem, we need the following two facts about balls and bins processes.
Fact 2. Let f : N 7→ N be any function in ω(1). Suppose n ≤ √m/ f (m) balls are assigned independently and
uniformly at random to m bins. Then the expected number of balls in the fullest bin is 1+ o(1).
Fact 3. Let f : N 7→ N denote any non-decreasing function in ω(1) with f (1) ≥ 3. Suppose n ≤ m · f (m) · lnm
balls are assigned independently and uniformly at random to m bins. Then the expected number of balls in the fullest
bin is at most f (m) · lnm +O (√ f (m) · lnm) = (1+ o(1)) · f (m) · lnm.
Although these facts are folklore, we are not aware of any proofs in the literature that are formulated in precisely
the way they are required here. For the sake of completeness, we present the proofs in the appendix.
Theorem 4. For every m, there exists an instance of the resource allocation game with m machines admitting a Nash
equilibrium P with
SC(P) =
(
1
4
− o(1)
)
· lnm
ln lnm
· SC(F).
The instance consists of n = O ( f (m) · m lnm) jobs whose weights differ at most by a factor O ( f (m) · lnm), where
f is an arbitrary function in ω(1).
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Proof. The counterexample uses only two different kinds of jobs: Large jobs of weight 1 and small jobs of weight 1k ,
k ∈ N. Let ` ≤ m denote the number of large jobs. The number of small jobs is k(m − `). Thus, the total weight is
m and the optimal assignment has social cost 1. We show that the fully mixed equilibrium has a social cost close to
optimal if the parameters k and ` are chosen appropriately.
Lemma 5. If k = Ω( f (m) · lnm) and ` = O (√n/ f (m)) then SC(F) ≤ 2+ o(1).
Proof. Recall that F assigns each job with probability 1m to each of the machines.
• The assignment of the large jobs corresponds to a balls-and-bins experiment in which ` = O (√m/ f (m)) balls are
assigned uniformly at random to m bins. Fact 2 yields that for this experiment, the expected number of balls in the
fullest bin is 1+ o(1). Thus, the expected maximum load due to the large jobs is 1+ o(1), too.
• The assignment of the small jobs corresponds to a balls-and-bins experiment in which k(m − `) balls are assigned
uniformly at random to m bins for k = Ω( f (m) · lnm). Fact 3 shows that for this experiment, the expected number
of balls in the fullest bin is (1+o(1))·k. Since each ball corresponds to a job of weight 1/k, the expected maximum
load due to the small jobs is thus 1+ o(1) as well.
Combining the upper bounds for the small and the large jobs yields that the maximum load over all machines is at
most 2+ o(1) when taking into account all the jobs. 
Next, we present a mixed Nash equilibrium whose maximum load is lower-bounded by a function in `.
Lemma 6. There exists a Nash equilibrium P with
SC(P) ≥ (1− o(1)) · ln `
ln ln `
.
Proof. We construct P in the following way. The small jobs are assigned using pure strategies. They are distributed
evenly among the machines 1, . . . ,m − ` such that each machine receives k small jobs. Hence, their load is fixed to
1. The large jobs are assigned to each of the remaining ` machines with probability 1/`. Again, the expected load of
these machines is 1. This is a Nash equilibrium, since no job can improve by a unilateral move:
• For a small job i assigned to machine ji , we have c jii = 1 and c ji = 1+ 1/k for j 6= ji .
• For a large job i , we have c ji = 2− 1/k if j > m − ` and c ji = 2 if j ≤ m − `.
The social cost of this equilibrium equals the maximum occupancy of the balls-and-bins experiment, where ` balls
are assigned uniformly at random to ` bins. It is well-known that the maximum occupancy of this assignment is
(1± o(1)) · (ln `/ ln ln `) (see, e.g. [10]). 
The ratio between the bounds in Lemmas 5 and 6 is maximised by choosing ` as large as possible under the
constraints specified in Lemma 5. W.l.o.g., let f (n) = O (ln n). We set ` = Θ(√m/ f (m)). In this way,
SC(P) ≥
(
1
2
− o(1)
)
· lnm
ln lnm
and SC(F) ≤ 2+ o(1).
This completes the proof of Theorem 4. 
Let us remark that we can fine-tune the above example such that for m = 14 machines and ` = 3 large jobs, the
expected maximum load of P is 17/9 and the expected maximum load of F is 15/9+ 3/14+  < 17/9, where  > 0
can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the number of small jobs. Thus, there is a counterexample to the FMNE
conjecture with only 14 machines.
3. Approximating worst-case equilibria
In this section, we assume that jobs are ordered such that w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn . Also, w.l.o.g., we assume that the
average load is 1, i.e.
∑n
i=1wi = m. Now, we define the quantities
Mi := e+ wi ln(e+ i)ln(e+ wi ln(e+ i)) and M := maxi∈[n] Mi , (1)
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where e = 2.71 . . . is the Eulerian constant. We will see that the social cost of the worst Nash equilibrium of a
given instance is Θ(M). In the next subsection, we establish a lower bound by specifying an algorithm that outputs a
Nash equilibrium of value Ω(M). Subsequently, we prove that an upper bound O (M) exists on the social cost of any
equilibrium.
3.1. The algorithm
We present an algorithm that constructs a Nash equilibrium that favours collisions between large jobs on few
machines. It proceeds by partitioning the set of jobs into i large jobs and n − i small jobs for a suitable index i . Then,
all large jobs are assigned to machines {1, . . . , k} for a minimal k such that these machines are not overloaded; that is,
the average load on these machines is at most 1. Additionally, small jobs are moved to machines {1, . . . , k} in order
to guarantee that this produces a Nash equilibrium. The index i is chosen such that Mi is maximised. The pseudocode
of algorithm GREEDY-NASH is given below.
Algorithm 1 The GREEDY-NASH algorithm. Input: a number of machinesm ∈ N, a number of jobs n ∈ N, and vector
(wi )i∈[n] of job weights in non-increasing order.
// find suitable threshold that separates large from small jobs
Find an i ∈ [n] that maximises Mi .
// distribute largest jobs on first machines
Let W ←∑ij=1w j .
Choose k = dWe.
plj ← 1/k for j ∈ {1, . . . , i} and l ∈ {1, . . . , k}
// ensure that smaller jobs are satisfied, too
for all jobs j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n} in weight-decreasing order of w j do
// Is the cost for job j smaller when assigned to left machines 1, . . . , k?
if Wk ≤ Wtot−W−w jm−k then
// assign uniform probabilities to left machines 1, . . . , k
plj ← 1/k for l ∈ {1, . . . , k}
W ← W + w j .
else
// assign uniform probabilities to right machines k + 1, . . . ,m
plj ← 1/(m − k) for l ∈ {k + 1, . . . ,m}
end if
end for
return ((p ji )i∈[n], j∈[m],Mi )
Note that the output of algorithm GREEDY-NASH as described in the pseudocode has size n·m. It can be represented
in a compact way by specifying k and the set of jobs assigned to machines {1, . . . , k}. In this way, the algorithm has
a linear running time.
Intuitively, the proof of our lower bound Mi proceeds by merging the jobs so that they have equal size, and applying
the following lemma on throwingΘ(k/wi ) balls with weightwi into k bins. Again, the proof of this lemma is included
in the appendix.
Fact 7. When n balls are thrown into m bins independently, uniformly at random, the expected number of balls in the
fullest bin is
Ω
(
n/m + ln(e+ m)
ln(e+ (m/n) ln(e+ m))
)
.
Thus, if the balls have weight w = m/n, so that the average load is 1, then the maximum weight over all bins is
Ω
(
1+ w ln(e+ m)
ln(e+ w ln(e+ m))
)
.
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Theorem 8. Let M be defined as in Eq. (1). A Nash equilibrium with expected maximal loadΩ(M) can be constructed
in time O (n), provided that the jobs are given in a non-increasing order of weight.
Proof. We first prove that the algorithm constructs a Nash equilibrium. We call the machines 1, . . . , k left machines
and the machines k + 1, . . . ,m right machines. Suppose that at the beginning of the for-loop, all jobs i + 1, . . . , n
are assigned to the machines on the right with a uniform probability 1/(m − k). Subsequently the algorithm may shift
some of these jobs to the machines on the left. Before the loop starts, all jobs in 1, . . . , i are satisfied because they
only use the left machines, and the expected load on every left machine is W/k, whereas the loads on every right
machine is (Wtot −W )/(m − k) ≥ W/k by our choice of k.
Note that it is an invariant of the loop that the total weight of jobs on left machines equals the value of the variable
W . We have to show that after one pass of the loop, job j is satisfied and no jobs in {1, . . . , j −1} become unsatisfied.
Since job j goes to the group of machines on which all other jobs induce the smaller expected load, job j is obviously
satisfied. If job j is assigned to the right machines, the situation does not change and no other job can become
unsatisfied. If job j is assigned to the left machines only, other jobs on left machines can get unsatisfied. Assume that
job j ′ < j becomes unsatisfied. This job has weight w j ′ > w j , and this job being unsatisfied means that
Wtot −W − w j
m − k <
W + w j − w j ′
k
≤ W
k
.
However, if this is the case, then job j would have been assigned to the right machines. Hence, the assignment returned
by the algorithm is a Nash equilibrium.
We now show that this assignment has a social cost of at least Ω(Mi ). For the time being, assume that
∑i
j=1w j >
1, that is k ≥ 2 and the average load induced by jobs 1, . . . , i on the left machines is at least 1/2. For the purpose of
the analysis, we repeatedly split the jobs 1, . . . , i −1 into halves until their weight is in the range [wi , 2wi ]. This way,
the number of jobs with weight in [wi , 2wi ] is some number i ′ ≥ i . In [3], it was shown that this inverse ball fusion
does not increase the expected maximum load on the left machines. Finally, we reduce all job weights down to wi ,
again not increasing the expected maximum load. The average load on the left machines is still at least 1/4. Then it
follows from Fact 7, that now the expected maximum load is at least
Ω
(
e+ wi ln(e+ k)
ln(e+ wi ln(e+ k))
)
.
This term gives a lower bound of Ω(Mi ) if we assume that wi ≥ 1/k as, in this case, i ′ · wi ≤ k implies k ≥
√
i ′
which gives ln(e+ k) = Ω(ln(e+ i ′)) = Ω(ln(e+ i)).
We are left with two special cases, in both of which we show that Mi = O (1) and hence is a trivial lower bound.
• ∑ij=1w j ≤ 1. In that case, our constructed Nash equilibrium has a trivial lower bound of 1. Furthermore,
Mi ≤ e+ wi ln(e+ i) ≤ e+ wi ln(e+ 2/wi ) ≤ e+ 2+ w1(e− 1) = O (1)
since ln(1+ ) ≤  for any  > 0.
• wi ≤ 1/k. Since wi ≤ k/ i we have i ≤ k/wi ≤ 1/w2i and hence wi ≤ 1/
√
i . Substituting this into Mi yields
Mi = O (1).
Thus in all cases, the social cost is lower bounded by Ω(Mi ). Since i is chosen to maximise Mi , it is also lower
bounded by Ω(M). 
3.2. Upper bound
The maximum load over all machines is equal to the maximum height over all jobs where the height of a job is
defined as follows. We assume that jobs are thrown into the machines according to the Nash probability distribution
one after another in non-increasing order of weight. The height of job i is the total weight of jobs on its machine at its
insertion time. The important property of this definition is that the height of job i does not depend on the assignments
of the jobs 1, . . . , i − 1. More formally, we define indicator variables I ji , where I ji = 1 if and only if ball i ∈ [n] is
assigned to machine j ∈ [m]. For any job i ∈ [n], let ji denote the machine that job i is assigned to and let
X i =
n∑
k=i
I jik wk
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denote the height of this job. Obviously X = maxi {X i }, the maximal height over all jobs, is equivalent to the maximum
load over the machines.
Theorem 9. Let M be defined as in Eq. (1). For any Nash equilibrium, it holds that E [X ] ≤ M.
Proof. Consider job i . For α ≥ 1, let q = 2 eα Mi . On every machine that job i assigns positive probability to, the
expected total load induced by jobs i + 1, . . . , n is upper bounded by 1 since we are at a Nash equilibrium, that is,
E [X i − wi ] ≤ 1. Applying a weighted Chernoff bound yields
P [X i − wi ≥ q] ≤
(
e
q
)q/wi
.
Observe that q ≥ e√e+ wi ln(e+ i) as x/ ln x ≥ √x for any x ≥ e. Hence,
P [X i − wi ≥ q] ≤
(
1√
e+ wi ln(e+ i)
)2eα ln(e+i)/ ln(e+wi ln(e+i))
=
(
1
e
)eα ln(e+i)
≤ 1
ieα
≤ 1
i2 2α
for i ≥ 2. Applying a union bound, we see that
P [X − w1 ≥ t · M] ≤ P [∃i : X i − wi ≥ t · Mi ] ≤ 2− t2e
n∑
i=1
1
i2
≤ 2− t2e · pi
2
6
and hence
E [X ] ≤ w1 +
∫ ∞
0
P [X − w1 ≥ t M]M dt
≤ w1 + M ·
(∫ 2e
0
P [X − w1 ≥ t M] dt +
∫ ∞
2e
P [X − w1 ≥ t M] dt
)
≤ w1 + M ·
(
2e+ pi
2
6
∫ ∞
2e
2−
t
2e dt
)
= O(M).
This finishes the proof of the theorem. 
4. Conclusions
We have shown that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is not the worst-case equilibrium; in fact it does not even give
a good approximation. In contrast, we have shown that concentrating large jobs on a few machines yields equilibria
that approximate the worst-case within a constant factor. As these equilibria can be constructed in linear time, we
obtained the first constant factor approximation for the worst-case Nash equilibrium.
Our analysis is restricted to identical machines. The question of whether the worst-case equilibria can be
approximated for the case of uniformly related machines remains open and is a challenging problem.
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Appendix
In the following, we present the proofs of the three facts used in the main part of the paper.
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Proof of Fact 2. The probability that there exists a bin with at least k ≥ 2 balls is at most
m ·
(
n
k
)(
1
m
)k
≤ n
k
k! ·
1
mk−1
≤ m
k/2
k! · f (m) · mk−1 ≤
1
k! · f (m) .
Therefore, the expected number of balls in the fullest bin is at most
1+
∑
k≥2
k
k! · f (m) = 1+ o(1). 
Proof of Fact 3. Fix any bin. The expected number of balls assigned to that bin is f (m) · lnm. Applying a Chernoff
bound (see, e.g. [11]), we obtain the result that the probability that a bin receives at least (1+ ) · f (m) · lnm balls is
at most
exp
(
−1
3
min{, 2} · f (m) · lnm
)
,
for any  > 0. For t > 1, let p(t) denote the probability that the maximum occupancy is at least t · f (m) · lnm.
Applying the union bound and substituting  = t − 1 into the above bound yields
p(t) ≤ m · exp
(
−1
3
min{(t − 1)2, t − 1} · f (m) · lnm
)
. (A.1)
The expected maximum occupancy is upper-bounded by
f (m) · lnm ·
(
τ +
∫ ∞
τ
p(t)dt
)
,
for any τ ≥ 1. Observe that, for τ ∈ [1, 2],∫ ∞
τ
p(t) dt =
∫ 2
τ
p(t) dt +
∫ ∞
2
p(t) dt =
∫ 2−τ
0
p(τ + t) dt +
∫ ∞
0
p(2+ t) dt.
We choose τ = 1+
√
3
f (m) . Since, by our assumption, f (m) ≥ 3, we have τ ≤ 2. For the first term, the minimum in
Eq. (A.1) takes the value of the second argument and hence we get∫ 2−τ
0
p(τ + t)dt ≤
∫ ∞
0
m · exp
−1
3
(√
3
f (m)
+ t
)2
f (m) lnm
 dt
=
∫ ∞
0
m · exp
(
−1
3
(
3
f (m)
+ 2
√
3
f (m)
t + t2
)
f (m) lnm
)
dt
≤
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− 2√
3
t
√
f (m) lnm
)
dt
=
√
3
2
√
f (m) lnm
.
For the second term we get∫ ∞
0
p(2+ t)dt ≤
∫ ∞
0
m · exp
(
− f (m) lnm
3
(t + 1)
)
dt = 3
f (m) ln(m)m f (m)/3−1
.
Hence, the expected maximum occupancy is at most
f (m) lnm
(
1+
√
3
f (m)
+
√
3
2
√
f (m) lnm
+ 3
f (m) ln(m)m f (m)/3−1
)
= f (m) lnm +O
(√
f (m) lnm
)
.

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Proof of Fact 7. Let L be the random variable that describes the number of balls in the fullest bin. We can safely
assume that 1/w = n/m ≤  ln(e+m) for some constant  > 0 to be determined later. (If 1/w = n/m ≥  ln(e+m),
the lower bound on the expected number of balls in the fullest bin is Ω(n/m) and holds trivially.)
Let
M = δ lnm
ln(e+ w ln(e+ m))
for some constant δ ∈ (0, 1] to be defined later. In order to prove the claim (under the assumption n/m ≤  ln(e+m))
it suffices to show that P [L ≥ M] ≥ 1 − 1/e. For i ∈ [m], let Ei be the event that bin i contains at least M balls.
Then we have
P [L ≥ M] = P [∃i ∈ [m] : Ei ]
= 1− P [∀i ∈ [m] : ¬Ei ]
≥ 1−
m∏
i=1
P
[
¬Ei
∣∣∣∣∣i−1∧
j=1
¬E j
]
.
Now observe that P [¬Ei ] is non-increasing when conditioned on the fact that the bins 1, . . . , i − 1 received less than
M balls. Hence,
P [L ≥ M] ≥ 1−
m∏
i=1
P [¬Ei ] = 1− (1− P [E1])m .
It remains to show that P [E1] ≥ 1/m, since this asserts the desired bound of 1− 1/e. Now,
P [E1] ≥
(
n
M
)(
1
m
)M (
1− 1
m
)n−M
≥
(
n
M
)(
1
m
)M (
1− 1
m
)n
≥
(
1
wM
)M (1
4
)n/m
≥
(
1
wM
)M (1
4
) ln(e+m)
.
Since 4− ln(e+m) ≥ 1/√m if  is chosen to be sufficiently small, it only remains to show that (wM)−M ≥ 1/√m as
well. In fact,(
1
wM
)M
≥
(
1
w ln(e+ m)
) δ ln(e+m)
ln(ln(e+m)) ≥
(
1
e
)δ ln(e+m)
≥ 1√
m
if δ is chosen sufficiently small. 
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